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Trumpeting Justice: The Implications of U.S. Law and Policy
for the International Rendition of Terrorists from Failed or
Uncooperative States
Matthew A. Slater*
I. Introduction
A. Overview
The barbarous attacks of September 11th brought
unforgettable fear, shock, and suffering upon the people of the
United States. In coordinated attacks, international terrorists
hijacked two U.S. airliners and crashed them into New York's
World Trade Center Towers, collapsing both buildings.
Moments later, a third hijacked airliner rammed into the side of
the Pentagon. A fourth hijacked airliner went down in a field
outside Pittsburgh, causing speculation that the doomed flight
was aimed for the U.S. Capitol.' Approximately 2,700 people
died as a result of these attacks.
America has seen war, but this was the first time in over
130 years, since the Civil War, that war was waged on the soil of
the continental United States. The attack on Pearl Harbor during
World War II showed that the United States is not immune from
attack, but September 1 1 th awakened the nation to the dangers of
attacks on innocent civilians. By striking the World Trade
* J.D., University of Miami School of Law (2003); B.A., Skidmore
College (2000); Graduate of the Engalitcheff Institute on Comparative
Political and Economic Systems at Georgetown University (1999). The
author would like to thank Professor Mary Coombs at the University of
Miami School of Law for her invaluable insight, guidance, and patience
during both the research and writing phases of this project.
1American Airlines Flight 11 crashed into the north tower of the World
Trade Center at 8:45 a.m., United Airlines Flight 175 hit the south
tower at 9:03 a.m., American Airlines Flight 77 collided into the
Pentagon at 9:43 a.m., and United Airlines Flight 93 went down in
Somerset County, Pennsylvania at 10:10 a.m. See September 11:
Chronology of Terror, at
http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/09/1 l/chronology.attack.
2 Frank J. Murray, September 11 Defrauders Sought Out, Police have
Arrested 37 Suspected in Lost-Relative Scams, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 4,
2003, at A2, available at 2003 WL 7703411.
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Center and the Pentagon, international terrorists sought to strike
the economic and military power centers of the United States
and, in doing so, committed heinous crimes that killed innocent
civilians. In the days following the terrorist attacks, President
Bush announced the commencement of a war on terror. In his
address to the nation on September 20, 2001, President Bush
stressed that the United States would either bring its enemies to
justice or bring justice to its enemies.3
B. Framework for Discussion
Advanced communications, increased transportation
capabilities, and international commerce make it possible for
terrorists to violate U.S. laws while living outside our borders.
Recent captures of terrorists around the world, as well as U.S.
intelligence reports, indicate that terrorists are hiding in some
foreign states that have dysfunctional central governments or are
led by regimes unwilling to cooperate with the United States.
The United States is therefore confronted with situations in
which international terrorists may operate from either "failed" or
uncooperative states.
This essay explores the issues of obtaining custody of
international terrorists from either failed or uncooperative states.
This discussion will focus on bringing international terrorists to
the United States for criminal prosecution. It will not discuss the
issue of obtaining custody of suspected terrorists to hold as
"detainees" for interrogation purposes.
3 President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress
(Sept. 20, 2001), at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html.
4 See generally Alan Sipress, US. Says War Effort Remains Intense,
WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 2002, at A14, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-adv/archives/front.htm.
5 See Kenneth Anderson, What to do with Bin Laden and al Qaeda
Terrorists?: A Qualified Defense of Military Commissions and United
States Policy on Detainees at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, 25 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 591, 621 (2002)for a discussion about the detainees
at the Guantanamo Naval Base.
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II. Jurisdiction To Try International Terrorists
A. Overview
An inquiry into jurisdiction is the first-step in
determining whether international terrorists may be brought from
a foreign state to the United States to face criminal prosecution.
It is important to examine the issue of whether the United States
has extraterritorial jurisdiction over terrorists through the
following two-step analysis. It must first be determined whether
relevant U.S. constitutional and statutory law authorizes the
exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction to prosecute terrorists.
The second step is to determine whether customary international
law, in so far as it is part of U.S. law, limits the extraterritorial
application of U.S. law.6
B. The Constitution Permits Congress to
Exercise Jurisdiction over International
Terrorists
The exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction to carry out
the war on terror, to prosecute international terrorists, is
consistent with U.S. domestic law. The U.S. Constitution does
not include any express limits on the reach of congressional
authority.7 Rather, it grants Congress the power to "make all
laws which shall be necessary and proper." 8 Since the
Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate commerce
with foreign nations, 9 the legislative power could be used to
make criminal laws necessary and proper for carrying out the
6 This analysis applies to criminal prosecution of terrorists before U.S.
courts and not in front of international tribunals.
7 See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, US. Law Enforcement Abroad: The
Constitution and International Law, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 880, 881
(1989). See also United States v. Felix-Gutierrez, 940 F.2d 1200, 1204
(1991) (holding that "generally there is no constitutional bar to the
extraterritorial application of United States penal laws.")
8 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18.
9 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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regulation of commerce. ' The Constitution specifically
authorizes Congress to act extraterritorially through the power to
"define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high
seas, and offenses against the law of nations." 11 The
Constitution also clearly contemplates the exercise of
extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction since it grants Congress the
power to direct the location of trials for crimes committed
outside U.S. territory that violate U.S. law. 12 Accordingly,
Congress has exercised extraterritorial jurisdiction over
international terrorists. There is a general presumption against
the extraterritorial application of a statute unless Congress
manifests its intent for the law to reach outside U.S. territory. 3
Under 18 U.S.C. § 2331, international terrorism is
defined as including "activities that involve violent acts or acts
dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws
of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal
violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United
States or of any State."' 4 Such acts are subject to U.S. criminal
jurisdiction even when they transcend national boundaries.
Examples include, if the mail system is used to carry out the
crime, if there is an effect on interstate or foreign commerce, if
the victim or intended victim is the U.S. government or an agent
of the government, if property involved is owned or leased by
the U.S. government, or if the offense is committed in the
territorial sea of the U.S. 5
Congress also specifically exercises jurisdiction over any
person who uses or attempts, threatens, or conspires to use a
weapon of mass destruction against the United States or U.S.
nationals abroad. 6 Jurisdiction is also asserted over any person
10 Lowenfeld, supra note 7, at 881.
"U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 10.
12 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
13 United States v. Usama Bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d 189, 193 (2000).
14 18 U.S.C. § 233 1(])(A) (2002).
'" 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(a) (2002).
16 18 U.S.C. § 2332a(a)(1)-(3) (2002).
VOL. 12
TRUMPETING JUSTICE
who harbors or conceals a terrorist, 7 or who provides material
support to terrorists8 or designated terrorist organizations. 19
These provisions, which apply to anyone within the United
States or subject to U.S. jurisdiction, could therefore apply to
foreign aliens who provide support to terrorists or terrorist
organizations. U.S. law specifically covers U.S. nationals who
kill or attempt to kill U.S. nationals while outside U.S.
territory.2° In addition, Congress exercises jurisdiction over any
person who kills any officer or employee (including members of
the military) of the United States.2'
C. Jurisdiction under Customary International
Law
The next step in this jurisdictional analysis is to examine
whether the assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction over
international terrorists complies with the accepted principles of
international law. The five bases of jurisdiction recognized by
customary international law are territoriality, nationality, the
protective principle, universality, and passive personality. 22
Each of the principles will be addressed in turn below.
Territoriality can be divided into two principles, ordinary
and objective. The ordinary territorial principle permits the
United States to assert jurisdiction over criminal acts committed
17 18 U.S.C. § 2339(a) (2002).
18 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2002).
'9 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2002).20 18 U.S.C. § 1119(b) (2002).
21 18 U.S.C. § 1114 (2002).
22 See Harvard Research in International Law, Jurisdiction with Respect
to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L. L. 443, 445 (Supp. 1935). The Harvard
Research Project analyzed national criminal statutes, criminal
procedure, and the writings of international scholars and jurists, to
attempt to resolve the problem of gaps in overlapping jurisdiction.
Based upon their inquiry into international criminal jurisdiction, the
researchers produced the Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with
Respect to Crime.
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within its territory.23 For example, because the terrorist attacks
on New York and Washington, D.C. occurred on U.S. soil,
jurisdiction over these terrorist attacks is valid under the ordinary
territorial principle.
The objective territorial principle permits the United
States to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction for acts of terrorism
that are initiated or planned outside the United States, but either
occur in or have effects that intrude into U.S. territory.24 The
terrorist attacks of September 11th appear to have been planned,
at least in part, outside U.S. territory. Investigators have
successfully traced the planning of the conspiracy to operatives
in Malaysia, Germany, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the United
Arab Emirates.25 Thus, jurisdiction to bring the planners of the
23 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 402(1) (1987) [ hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. See also
1 LASSA OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW § 143 (H. Lauterpacht
ed., 8th ed. 1955) [hereinafter OPPENHEIM].
24 See Jordan J. Paust, Federal Jurisdiction Over Extraterritorial Acts
of Terrorism and Nonimmunity for Foreign Violators of International
Law Under the FSIA and the Act of State Doctrine, 23 VA. J. INT'L L.
191, 204-09 (1983). Also referred to as the effects doctrine, the
objective territorial principle has roots as early as The Case of the S.S.
Lotus. On August 2, 1926, the Lotus, a French mail steamer, and the
Boz-Kourt, a Turkish coal carrying vessel, collided. As a result of the
collision, the Boz-Kourt sank, killing eight Turkish nationals. When the
Lotus reached Constantinople, the Turkish authorities began criminal
proceedings against the French officer on watch duty at the time of the
collision, and ultimately, convicted him of manslaughter. France sued
Turkey in the Permanent Court of International Justice challenging
Turkey's claim of jurisdiction to prosecute the French officer as
inconsistent with the principles of international law. The Court held
that international law permits a state to apply its criminal statutes to
acts that are planned or take place outside its territory, as long as the
effects of the act occur on the state seeking to apply its criminal laws.
The Case of the S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A)A
No. 10, reprinted in; 2 Hudson, World Ct. Rep. 20, 32-40 (1935).
25 Dan Eggen, FBI Says Malaysia was site of Sept. II Planning, WASH.
POST, Feb. 1, 2002, at A I5, available at 2002 WL 10945091.
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September 1 th attacks to justice is valid under the objective
territorial principle.26
Under the nationality principle, the United States may
lawfully exercise jurisdiction over its nationals who commit or
are involved in terrorist acts regardless of the target or where the
defendant was when he acted.2 The case of John Walker Lindh
illustrates the lawful exercise of U.S. jurisdiction under the
nationality principle. Lindh, a U.S. national, converted to Islam
in 1997, traveled through Central Asia, trained at a terrorist
training camp, and fought alongside al Qaeda and Taliban forces
before being captured in Afghanistan.28
The United States transported Lindh back to the United
States to face charges for helping terrorist organizations and
conspiring to kill Americans abroad. One of the counts in the
federal indictment charged Lindh with violating 18 U.S.C. §
2332(b), which makes it a crime for U.S. nationals to kill or
attempt to kill U.S. nationals while outside U.S. territory.' 9
Lindh plead guilty to supplying services to the Taliban in
violation of 50 U.S.C. § 1705(b), 31 C.F.R. § 545.204, and 31
26 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 23, § 402(1)(c). While the objective
territorial principle is recognized by international law, it is also
somewhat controversial and many foreign governments do not
recognize it. Controversy exists with extension of the objective
territorial principle to actions that are intended to have effects within a
state, but ultimately do not (i.e. a terrorist plot that is planned and
financed, but is aborted). The Restatement recognizes the objective
territorial principle, but requires the conduct to have or is intended to
have substantial effects. See also Alan Hyde, Rights for Canadian
Members of International Unions Under the (U.S.) Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1007, 1023 (1986).
27 OPPENHEIM, supra note 23, § 330.
28 See David Johnston, A Nation Challenged- The American Prisoner;
Walker will Face Terrorism Counts in a Civilian Court, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 16, 2002, at Al, available at 2002 WL 11164322.
29 See Lindh's plea bargain agreement, United States v. Lindh, 227 F.
Supp. 2d 565 (E.D. Va. 2002), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/pleaagreement.htm. Note specifically the
section entitled "Unlawful Enemy Combatant Status."
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C.F.R. § 545.206(a), as well as carrying an explosive during the
commission of a felony in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(2).3 °
Lindh pled guilty in exchange for a 20-year sentence in federal
prison. 31 The government entered into the plea bargain after
Lindh agreed to disclose everything he knew about the Taliban
32
and Osama bin Laden. The agreement was reached at 2:00
a.m. on the day that the trial court was set to hear challenges to
the evidence against Lindh in open court.33 At the sentencing
hearing, Judge Ellis noted that the evidence linking Lindh to al
Qaeda was not strong and there was no evidence tying Lindh to
the death of Johnny Michael Spann, a C.I.A. officer, as the
government had indicated.34 Despite Judge Ellis's ruling, this
case demonstrates that U.S. assertion of jurisdiction over Lindh
was proper under the nationality principle.
The protective principle permits a state to exercise
extraterritorial jurisdiction for "conduct outside its territory by
persons not its nationals that is directed against the security of
the state."35  It provides for jurisdiction over acts committed
outside a state's territory directed to interfere with the state's
"governmental functions," provided that the acts are also a
violation of the laws of the host state.36 The protective principle
is generally invoked to assert jurisdiction over politically
motivated acts, but it is not limited to acts that have political
purposes.3' The Second Circuit Court of Appeals recently
30 id.
31 Richard Harrington, Earle's Lindh Song Hits Sour Note in Nashville,
WASH. POST, July, 23, 2002, at C1, available at 2002 WL 23855432.
32 John Johnson, Lindh Begins Sentence at Prison in Victorville, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 20, 2003, at B 1, available at 2003 WL 2386516.
33 See Jane Mayer, Why did the Government's Case against John
Walker Lindh Collapse?, NEW YORKER, Mar. 10, 2003, at 50.
34 'I Made a Mistake by Joining the Taliban '; Apologetic Lindh Gets 20
Years, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 2002, at Al, available at 2002 WL
101066004.
35 RESTATEMENT, supra note 23,§402(3).
36 In re Marc Rich & Co., 707 F.2d 663, 666 (2d Cir. 1983).
37 United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 110 (2d Cir. 2003).
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upheld jurisdiction over Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, an alleged
terrorist, citing the protective principle of customary
international law.38 Yousef was convicted in the District Court
for the Southern District of New York for his involvement in the
February 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, as well as
his involvement in a plot to bomb U.S.-flagged airliners in
Southeast Asia in 1994-1995. 39 The court stated that Yousef s
plots were intended to influence U.S. foreign policy, the making
of which constitutes a "governmental function." 40 The
September 1 1 th attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon
were clearly meant to interfere with the functioning of the U.S.
government. Therefore, extraterritorial jurisdiction over the
international terrorists involved in the planning of these attacks
is valid under the protective principle.
Under the universality principle, a state may exercise
extraterritorial jurisdiction to "enforce its criminal laws that
punish universal crimes." 41 It permits states to prescribe and
prosecute certain offenses recognized by the international
community as crimes of universal concern. 4 2 U.S. criminal
statutes cover terrorism, but it is debatable whether terrorism is
yet considered a universal crime. In affirming jurisdiction over
Yousef, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
38 id.
39 Id. at 83. On February 26, 1993, Yousef was one of the terrorists who
drove a van filled with explosives into the parking garage below the
World Trade Center. The bombs were set to explode by timer, and
killed six people and injured over a thousand individuals.
Approximately a year and a half later, Yousef orchestrated a plot to
bomb U.S. airliners. According to the plan, five terrorists would place
bombs aboard twelve U.S.-flagged airliners in Southeast Asia,
construct the bombs on the aircraft, and de-plane during the first
layover. The plot was discovered in 1995 and Yousef was arrested in
Pakistan and returned to the U.S. to face charges for his involvement in
these crimes.40Id. at 110.
41 RESTATEMENT, supra note 23, § 423.
42 United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
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District Court erred in finding jurisdiction on the basis of the
universality principle. 3 The court said that customary
international law does not permit prosecution for terrorist acts
because there is not currently a consensus on the definition of
terrorism. 4 It noted that the class of crimes subject to universal
jurisdiction, which traditionally include only acts of piracy, has
been expanded to include war crimes and crimes against
humanity. 45 The court said that even if aircraft hijacking is
considered a crime against all nations, it is improper for a court
to draw a judicial analogy between hijacking and placing a bomb
aboard an aircraft.46 Some international legal scholars, however,
do recognize that the universality principle could apply to certain
acts of terrorism. 47 This assertion of jurisdiction is based on the
fact that the crimes are so heinous that they are of universal
concern. The Second Circuit's recent decision, however,
provides some indication that U.S. courts would probably be
hesitant to find the universality principle as a basis ofjurisdiction
over international terrorists.
Finally, the passive personality principle permits a state
to exercise jurisdiction over offenses committed against their
nationals abroad. 48 It is the most controversial basis for
jurisdiction under international law.49 In the past, the United
43 See Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, at 91.
44 Id at 97.
45 Id. at 104. See also Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, at 1091 (stating that the
universal principle covers piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking
aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and certain acts of terrorism).
46 See Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, at 98-99.47 See Tyler Raimo, Winning at the Expense of Law: The Ramifications
of Expanding Counter- Terrorism Law Enforcement Jurisdiction
Overseas, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1473, 1490 (1999). See also United
States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896, 901-02 (1988) (recognizing that
some international legal scholars recognize that terrorist acts can be
considered heinous crimes for purposes of asserting universal
jurisdiction).
48 Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896, at 901.
49 id.
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States had objected to the assertion ofjurisdiction on the grounds
of the passive personality principle out of fear that it would lead
to indefinite criminal liability for U.S. citizens. 0 This fear was
premised on the notion that foreigners visiting the United States
should comply with U.S. laws and should not be able to transport
the laws of their state with them.5' The Restatement recognizes
that the passive personality principle has not been generally
accepted, but it is increasingly being accepted with regards to
52terrorists. The United States now recognizes this principle.
For example, the United States relied on the passive
personality principle when it sought the extradition of
Muhammed Abbas Zaiden, a terrorist who killed an American
citizen when he hijacked the Achille Lauro, a vessel in Egyptian
waters. 3 Additionally, based partly on the passive personality
principle, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
affirmed jurisdiction over Fawaz Yunis, a terrorist who hijacked
a Jordanian aircraft in the Middle East that had U.S. nationals
aboard.14 Because the international community is increasingly
accepting the passive personality principle with regards to
terrorists, it is likely that the United States may continue to use
the principle to assert jurisdiction over international terrorists
who harm U.S. nationals abroad.
In determining whether it is lawful for the United States
to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over terrorists, U.S. courts
must determine whether the United States has the legal authority
to reach the conduct in question, and whether the relevant
50 2 J.B. Moore, International Law Digest § 201, at 228 (1906)
(reporting Cutting's Case, where in 1887 the U.S. Government objected
to Mexico asserting its jurisdiction over an American national who was
prosecuted for writing an article criticizing a Mexican national in a
Texas newspaper).
51 Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896, at 902 (The United States does not want its
nationals prosecuted for acts they did not know were illegal under a
foreign state's laws).
52 RESTATEMENT, supra note 23, § 402(g).
53 Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896, at 902-03.54 Id. at 903.
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statutes have extraterritorial effect. 5 It is well established that
"international law is part of our law," 56 and as such courts, when
reviewing U.S. assertions of jurisdiction over international
terrorists, must interpret U.S. laws and actions consistently with
international law.57
Il. Extradition
A. Overview
Extradition is the formal process with which the state
surrenders a criminal suspect to another state for prosecution or
punishment. 58 Extradition is premised on the fundamental
principle of international law that requires States to respect the
territorial integrity and sovereignty of other States. 59 Generally,
agents of one State may not enter another State to apprehend a
criminal suspect without the host State's permission.60 The
process of extradition is formal and obligations are defined
through treaties. 61 Two fundamental aspects of extradition
treaties are reciprocity and comity. These principles refer to
friendly cooperation between states. Reciprocity involves a
foreign government granting an extradition request on the
55 United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1512 (1990).
56 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
57 See Alexander Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) 64, 117-18 (1804) (stating that "an act of Congress ought
never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction remains").
58 See OPPENHEIM, supra note 23, § 327. See also Terlinden v. Ames,
184 U.S. 270, 289 (1902) (defining extradition in detail as the
"surrender by one nation to another of an individual accused or
convicted of an offence outside of its own territory, and within the
territorial jurisdiction of the other, which, being competent to try and to
9unish him, demands the surrender").
See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 672 n.4 (1992).60 See Raimo, supra note 47, at 1505.
61 See United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 411 (1886) (describing
the formalities required by the extradition treaty between the United
States and Great Britain in 1842).
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promise that their future extradition requests will be honored.62
Comity is an act of courtesy by which States mutually recognize
each other's legislative, executive, and judicial actions on
extradition requests.63
The United States obtains criminal suspects from abroad
almost entirely through individually negotiated bilateral
extradition treaties.64 The Constitution recognizes treaties as the
supreme Law of the Land. 65 Treaties are compacts between
independent nations, which impose reciprocal obligations
equivalent to an act of the legislature. 6F By relying on
extradition treaties to obtain criminal suspects, the United States
attempts to act consistently with international law by not
violating the territorial integrity of other States. 6' Generally,
U.S. law only permits extradition to other states when a treaty is
in force between the two states.68 An exception to the treaty
requirement is stated in 18 U.S.C. § 3181(b), which provides for
extradition of non-U.S. citizens to stand trial for violent crimes
against Americans abroad.69
The United States has over 110 bilateral extradition
treaties with foreign states, and these states frequently grant U.S.
extradition requests. 70 In some cases, extradition requests have
resulted in criminal suspects being returned to the United States
through expulsion or deportation as opposed to formal
62 See M. Cherif Bassiouni, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED
STATES LAW AND PRACTICE 17 (3d ed. 1996).
63 id.
64 Report on International Extradition, Submitted to the Congress
Pursuant to Section 211 of the Admiral James W. Nance and Meg
Donovan Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2000 and
2001 (106 Pub.L. 113), at 1 [hereinafter Report].
65 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
66 Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, at 411.
67 Raimo, supra note 47, at 1504-05.
68 United States Attorney Manual § 9-15. 100 (Sept. 1997).
69 18 U.S.C. § 3181(b).
70 Report, supra note 64, at 3.
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extradition. 7 Formal extradition has not been very useful in
dealing with international terrorists. According to the U.S.
Department of State, thirteen international terrorists were
returned to the U.S. for prosecution between 1993 and 1999.72
Of the thirteen terrorists, only four were formally extradited.73
B. Extradition Requests
Extradition of suspected criminals is only sought from
foreign states with which the United States has an extradition
treaty.74 Requests for extradition have to go through a formal
process to be carried out. Through its Office of International
Affairs ("OIA"), the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ")
coordinates all foreign extradition requests. 75 Extradition
requests for international terrorists begin at either the federal or
state level of government.76 Because these requests have foreign
policy implications, they are not forwarded until the OIA
reviews them.77 The OIA assists prosecutors with preparation of
extradition requests, paperwork, and affidavits consistent with
the particular treaty and domestic law of the asylum state.7 ' The
extradition request is then transmitted to the U.S. Department of
State for translation into the native language of the asylum state
before it is sent to the U.S. Embassy in that state. 79 The
extradition request is then presented to the foreign government
71 id
72 Department of State, Extraditions/Rendition of Terrorists to the
United States 1993-1999, Electronic Archive (2001), at
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rs/pgtrpt/2000/2466.htm.
73 Id.
74 See 18 U.S.C. § 3181 for a list of countries with which the United
States has extradition treaties.
75 United States Attorney Manual, supra note 64, § 9-15.2 10.
76 Report, supra note 64, at 2.
77 United States Attorney Manual, supra note 68, § 9-15.100.
78 Id. § 9-15.240.
79 United States Attorney Manual, supra note 68, § 9-15.250.
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under the cover of a diplomatic note formally requesting
extradition. 0
C. Problems with Extradition
U.S. extradition requests are limited by the conditions
found in extradition treaties and the laws of foreign states. Some
states place restrictions on the extradition of their nationals.
8
'
France, Germany, and Brazil, for example, are prohibited by
their domestic laws from extraditing their nationals.82 Israel only
permits extradition if its nationals are permitted to serve-out any
criminal sentence in Israel.83 Some states will also not extradite
criminal suspects if the statute of limitations has been exceeded
8 4
or if the crime charged is a political offense.
85
Many states, including the members of the European
Union, will not extradite a criminal suspect unless it receives
assurances that the United States will not seek the death
penalty.86 This is because many states regard the death penalty
as a violation of human rights.87 Some states take this position a
step further. Mexico, for example, has recently refused to
extradite criminal suspects to the United States because life in
prison was a possible punishment.88
80 Id. § 9-15.300.
81 Report, supra note 64, at 4.
82 id.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 7.
85 See Roberta Smith, America Tries to Come to Terms with Terrorism:
The United States Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 v. British Anti-Terrorism Law and International Response, 5
CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 249, 252-253 (1997) (discussing that
suspects accused of terrorism have claimed they are engaged in
political acts and cannot be extradited because of the political offense
exception).
86 Report, supra note 64, at 6.87 id.
88 See Hugh Dellios, Mexico, US. Cultural Split Complicates
Extradition, CHI. TRIB., June 14, 2002, at Al, available at 2002 WL
2665253.
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The success of U.S. extradition requests is often
dependent on diplomatic relations. This is imperative since
extradition requests are made under the cover of a diplomatic
note and require the foreign state's cooperation.89 Extradition
treaties may be suspended due to a severance of diplomatic
relations if "the existence of diplomatic or consular relations is
indispensable for the application of the treaty."90 The suspension
of a treaty is not automatic. 9' However, a change in
circumstances between the treaty's signatories could be a basis
for suspension of the treaty. 92
In the context of international terrorists, exclusive
reliance on the formal process of extradition is problematic. The
United States may be faced with questions of whether there is an
extradition treaty in force after a change in government.93 For
example, the United States never signed an extradition treaty
with Pakistan.94 Had the U.S. government sought the return of
Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh for his role in the kidnap and murder
of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl, the lack of a treaty
could have been problematic. Both governments, however, have
recognized an extradition treaty that was signed between the
United States and the U.K. in 1931, and ratified by both states in
89 United States Attorney Manual, supra note 68, § 9-15.300.
90 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf. 39/27 at 289 (1969), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, Article 63.
91 See Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 508 (1947) (stating that the
outbreak of war does not necessarily suspend or abrogate a treaty).
92 See generally Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23,
1969, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/27 at 289 (1969), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331,
Article 62.
93 Linnas v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 790 F.2d 1024 (2d
Cir. 1986) (recognizing the lack of an extradition treaty between the
United States and the U.S.S.R.). Change of governments is different
from legal issues involved with state succession. It must be noted that
there was no extradition treaty between the United States and the
U.S.S.R. Therefore, the problem of state succession, as it relates to
extradition, presumably does not apply to the former Soviet Republics.
94 See Ari Fleischer, White House Press Briefing (Feb. 25, 2002), at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020225-16.html.
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1932. 95 Pakistan accepted the obligations of the extradition
treaty in 1952.96 The Pakistani government tried Saeed instead
of extraditing him to the United States.97
Pakistan's decision to prosecute Saeed instead of
extraditing him does not indicate a lack of cooperation.
President Pervez Musharraf insisted on Saeed being tried in
Pakistan before considering a U.S. extradition request.9" His
decision allowed Pakistan to cooperate with the United States in
prosecuting Saeed, while avoiding any backlash by dissidents if
the Musharraf government was seen as too eager to cooperate
with the United States. 99 Musharraf also wanted the Islamic
extremists in his country to witness a Pakistani court trying and
punishing terrorists for a horrific crime. 0
In order to satisfy an extradition state, extradition
treaties require sufficient evidence that the suspect committed a
crime.10 ' Since the United States seeks to try the suspects before
U.S. courts, the evidence must establish probable cause. There
are two potential problems with this requirement. First, no
matter how compelling the evidence presented is, the asylum
9' See 47 Stat. 2122; TS 849; 12 Bevans 482; 163 LNTS 59; 1932 WL
31047.
96 See Richard Boucher, Department of State Briefing (Feb. 26, 2002),
at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2002/8495.htm. See also United
States v. Khan, 993 F.2d 1368, 1372 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that the
U.S.-U.K. extradition treaty is the operative treaty between the United
States and Pakistan).
97 See 2 Victories-No Shots Fired, L.A. TIMES, July 16, 2002, at B12,
available at 2002 WL 2490125. See also Pearl Killing - Handover
Hitch, Belfast News Letter, Mar. 16, 2002, at 17, (stating that the U.S.
indicted Saeed out of concern that Pakistan may have released him).
98 Keith B. Richburg, 11 Charged in Pearl Killing; Prosecutor Voices
Confidence; 7 Suspects at Large, with True Identities of Some Unclear,
WASH. POST, Mar.22, 2002, A14, available at 2002 WL 17584870.
99 2 Victories-No Shots Fired, supra note 98.
'
00Id at B12.
101 See United States Attorney Manual, supra note 68, § 9-15.240
(listing documents required in support of request for extradition). See
also Report, supra note 64, at 7.
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could nonetheless deny an extradition request by citing a lack of
evidence. Second, the United States may not be willing to share
all of its evidence with the asylum state.
After the September 1 1th attacks, the Taliban suggested
that it would consider turning Osama bin Laden over to a neutral
country if it was given proof that bin Laden was indeed the
mastermind of the attacks. 10 2 The U.S. government, however,
was not willing to share its evidence and intelligence gathering
capabilities with the Taliban. The United States did not want
this information conveyed to terrorist organizations. 103 U.S.
national security could be harmed if terrorist organizations were
aware of U.S. intelligence capabilities.
IV. Informal Surrender
Often referred to as disguised extradition, informal
surrender involves a foreign state's cooperation with the request
for custody of a criminal suspect. This is done without the
formal process of extradition. Informal surrender often occurs
where the suspect is not a citizen of the host state and is
surrendered by a deportation or expulsion. For example,
Pakistani authorities informally surrendered Ramzi Ahmed
Yousef, one of the masterminds behind the 1993 World Trade
Center bombing. 104 On February 7, 1995, Yousef was
apprehended in Islamabad, Pakistan, and turned over to FBI
102 Dmitry Kirsanov, Taliban Ready to Extradite bin Laden, ITAR-
TASS News Agency, Oct. 3, 2001. If the Taliban turned bin Laden
over to another country, it would have done so through deportation or
expulsion since bin Laden is a national of Saudi Arabia. Moreover,
Pakistan was the only state that had diplomatic relations with the
Taliban regime.
103 Ari Fleischer, White House Press Briefing,(Oct. 2, 2001), at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011002-
11 .html#taliban-demand.
'04 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, TERRORISM IN THE
UNITED STATES 9 (1997), at
http://www.fbi.gov/publications/terror/terr97.pdf.
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Special Agents. 10 5 He was transported to the United States the
following day, without a formal extradition request or
proceeding.
0 6
Another example of informal surrender is the March 1,
2003 apprehension of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, the alleged
mastermind of the September 11 th attacks.'0 7 Mohammed's other
terrorist plots are believed to include the 1993 World Trade
Center bombing and the 2002 attack on the USS Cole.0 8 He was
indicted in the Southern District of New York in 1996 for the
1993 World Trade Center bombing. 19 After his capture by
Pakistani authorities, he was turned over to U.S. authorities and
is being detained at the U.S. air base at Bagram, Afghanistan.o
V. Luring
The U.S government has relied upon luring international
terrorists into its grasp as an alternative to traditional extradition.
In 1985, Fawaz Yunis, along with four other men, hijacked a
Royal Jordanian Airlines flight from Beirut, Lebanon."'
Wearing civilian attire, the hijackers carried military rifles and
grenades aboard the aircraft. 2 While Yunis seized control of
the cockpit, the remaining hijackers incapacitated Jordanian air
105 id.
106 Id.
107 See Liz Sly, Threat from bin Laden's Followers is Lower, Officials
Say, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 21, 2003, at 16, available at 2003 WL 17254163.
'08 Testimony of Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, FBI, before the U.S.
Senate Committee on the Judiciary on March 4, 2003. The War
Against Terrorism. Working Together to Protect America: Hearing
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 1 0 8 th Cong. 1 (2003) at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=612&witid=608.
'09 Michael Daly, In our Grasp Years Earlier, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Mar.
2, 2003, at 2, available at 2003 WL 4067029.
j"o This is different from the situation with the detainees in
Guantanamo Bay because Mohammed was indicted prior to being
taken into custody. See Anwar Iqbal, Pakistani Agents Raid Suspect's
Home Again, UNITED PRESS INT'L, Mar. 4, 2003.
... Yunis, 924 F. 2d 1086, at 1088-89.
112 Id. at 1089.
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marshals on the aircraft. 113 The hijackers informed the
passengers and crew that their destination was Tunis, the
location of the Arab League's headquarters.' 4 The two attempts
they made at landing in Tunis were thwarted by authorities who
blocked the runway.115 After a series of flights that saw stops in
Cyprus, Palermo, Sicily, and other locations along the
Mediterranean, Yunis and the other terrorist hijackers released
the airline passengers in Beirut, Lebanon, blew up the plane, and
fled the airport. ' 16 The FBI captured Yunis, a Lebanese citizen,
by luring him onto a yacht in the Mediterranean Sea under the
guise of a drug deal." 7 Once the vessel reached international
waters, the FBI agents arrested Yunis and transported him back
to Washington, D.C. where he was arraigned on federal charges
relating to conspiracy, hostage taking, and aircraft damage. "1
8
Yunis was convicted, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia affirmed the conviction despite Yunis'
jurisdictional challenge." 9
VI. Forcible Abduction
A. Overview
Formal extradition is not always viable. Successful
extradition is dependent upon diplomatic cooperation between
two states pursuant to the rules of international law. For criminal
suspects to be extradited there has to be a functioning
government in the asylum state that is able and willing to
cooperate with the state seeking extradition.' 2
113/id,
114id.
115 Id.
116id.
11714d
.
118 Id.
"
9 Id. at 1090.
120 Under international law, a state may refuse to extradite a criminal
suspect if doing so would violate a provision of the extradition treaty or
their domestic law. Id.
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If an asylum state is unable or unwilling to extradite
international terrorists to the United States, there are still several
alternatives to the formal extradition process. 121 First, the
asylum state can prosecute the international terrorist in its own
courts, and the United States could urge them to do so. 122
Second, the asylum state can expel or deport the wanted person
under its immigration laws. 123 Third, with the assistance of
agents of the asylum state, the terrorist can be surrendered
without any formal procedures. 124 Finally, U.S. agents can
abduct the terrorists.
125
B. Current U.S. Policy
U.S. policy recognizes impediments in extradition and
provides for alternative modes of rendition. Two months after
the bombing of the Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995,
President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive-39
("PDD-39"), articulating policy and guidelines for bringing
international terrorists to Justice.126 PDD-39 appears to establisha hierarchy of modes of rendition. 127
121 See Ethan Nadelmann, The Evolution of United States Involvement
in the International Rendition of Fugitive Criminals, 25 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 813, 813-14 (1993).
122 Id. at 813.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 813-14.
125 Id. at 814.
126 See Presidential Decision Directive-39: U.S. Policy on
Counterterrorism (June 21, 1995), at
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd39.htm.
127 We shall vigorously apply extraterritorial statutes to counter
acts of terrorism and apprehend terrorists outside of the United
States. When terrorists wanted for violation of U.S. law are at
large overseas, their return for prosecution shall be a matter of
the highest priority and shall be a continuing central issue in
bilateral relations with any state that harbors or assists them.
Where we do not have adequate arrangements, the Depart-
ments of State and Justice shall work to resolve the problem,
where possible and appropriate, through negotiation and
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According to PDD-39, once the United States
determines that it has extraterritorial jurisdiction over a criminal
suspect and seeks to bring him to the United States for trial, it
first seeks the cooperation of the asylum state. 28 The asylum
state may cooperate by agreeing to a formal U.S. extradition
request or by enforcing domestic immigration laws and
deporting or expelling the suspect. Under PDD-39, the United
States will "take appropriate measures to induce cooperation.''
29
Presumably these measures would include both economic and
diplomatic sanctions. For example, when Libya refused to hand
over the suspects (Fhimah and Megrahi) of the Pan Am 103
bombing in 1988, both the United Nations and the United States
applied economic sanctions on Libya.13° The sanctions were
applied to induce Libya to turn the suspects over for prosecution.
Nearly eleven years after the Pan Am bombing, Libya agreed to
extradite the suspects to the United Kingdom under an
agreement to have them tried by an international tribunal under
Scottish law at The Hague131
conclusion of new extradition treaties. If we do not receive
adequate cooperation from a state that harbors a terrorist
whose extradition we are seeking, we shall take appropriate
measures to induce cooperation. Return of suspects by force
may be effected without the cooperation of the host
government.
ld.
128 id.
129 id.
130 See Peter Finn, Libyan Begins Appeal of Lockerbie Conviction: New
Evidence Cited on Bomb's Origin, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 2002, A17,
available at 2002 WL 10942910.
31 See Rachel Blackburn, Lockerbie Timetable, PRESS ASS'N., May 29,
2002. The international community applied substantial diplomatic and
economic pressure on Col. Gaddafi and the Libyan government. The
terrorist suspects were transported by United Nations aircraft from
Libya to Camp Zeist, deemed to be Scottish territory for the trial in The
Hague. The proceedings lasted 84 days. Al Megrahi was convicted of
mass murder and sentenced to 20 years to life incarceration. Fhimah
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Economic and diplomatic sanctions are tools used to
induce a state to turn criminal suspects over for trial. According
to PDD-39, if an asylum state does not cooperate, U.S. agents
may forcibly return suspects to the United States for
prosecution. 132 This mode of rendition, sometimes referred to as
irregular rendition, is an alternative to formal extradition and, as
such, it takes place outside the parameters of extradition
treaties. "' U.S. courts have upheld forcible abductions as a
means of bringing criminal suspects to trial in the United
States. 1
34
Forcible abduction is the most controversial category of
irregular rendition, because although permitted by U.S. courts, it
violates customary international law.'35 An example of forcible
abduction is the kidnapping of Adolf Eichmann in 1960. Israel's
secret service, the Mossad, apprehended Eichmann, an SS officer
for the Nazis, near Buenos Aires, Argentina, in May 1960 and
transported him back to Israel for trial. 3 6 Although Argentina
protested Israel's breach of its borders as a violation of
sovereignty under international law, it was satisfied with an
was found not guilty and set free.
132 PDD-39, supra note 126.
13 See Melanie M. Laflin, Kidnapped Terrorists: Bringing
International Criminals to Justice through Irregular Rendition and
Other Quasi-legal Options, 26 J. LEGIS. 315 (2000).
14 See Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655.
135 See generally Jonathan A. Gluck, The Customary International Law
of State-Sponsored International Abduction and United States Courts,
44 DUKE L. J. 612 (1994).
136 See Major Christopher M. Supemor, International Bounty Hunters
for War Criminals. Privatizing the Enforcement of Justice, 50 A.F. L.
REV. 215, 226 (2001). Eichmann was an SS officer who rounded up
persons of Jewish ancestry and transported them to concentration
camps as part of Adolf Hitler's Final Solution. In the aftermath of
World War II, Eichmann escaped from a U.S. P.O.W. camp and moved
to Argentina in 1958. Israeli agents forcibly abducted Eichmann and
transported him back to Israel. He was found guilty of crimes against
humanity, and was executed on May 31, 1962.
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apology from Israel.137
Another example of forcible abduction involves the case
of John Surratt, an alleged co-conspirator of John Wilkes Booth
in the assassination of President Abraham Lincoln. 138 Law
enforcement officers apprehended Surratt after he fled to
Alexandria, Egypt. 139 He was returned to the United States and
tried for his alleged involvement in the assassination.140 The trial
resulted in a deadlocked jury and Surratt was freed from
custody. 141
VII. Current Law
A. U.S. Law
In Ker v. Illinois, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on the
legality of extraterritorial abduction.1 12 While living in Peru,
Frederick Ker was indicted by the State of Illinois for
embezzlement and larceny. 4 The Governor of Illinois
requested that the U.S. Secretary of State issue a warrant for
Ker's extradition from Peru, pursuant to the treaty between the
United States and Peru' 44 The President issued the warrant and
directed a messenger, Henry G. Julian, to present the warrant to
the Peruvian government and take custody of Ker.145 Instead of
following the requisite treaty procedures, Julian forcibly
137 Marian Nash Leich, US. Practice: Contemporary Practice of the
United States Regulating International Law, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 724, 726
(1990).
13s See Shuey v. United States, 92 U.S. 73 (1875).
39 Id. at 74.
140 id.
141 Frederick N. Rasmussen, Booth's Female Conspirator; Doubt Still
Lingers about Mary Surrat, Executed in 1865, BALT. SUN, Apr. 19,
2003, at 2D, available at 2003 WL 17686916.
142 Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
143 Id at 437-38.
144 Id. at 438.
145 id.
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abducted Ker and placed him on a ship bound for the United
States. 46 Ker was tried and convicted in Illinois. 147
The U.S. Supreme Court held that forcible abduction
was not a sufficient reason to divest the court ofjurisdiction once
Ker was brought before the court. 48 The Court reaffirmed this
rule in the interstate abduction case of Frisbie v. Collins,"49 in
which it held:
The power of a court to try a person for a crime
is not impaired by the fact that he had been
brought within the court's jurisdiction by reason
of a forcible abduction ... Due process of law is
satisfied when one present in court is convicted
of crime after having been fairly apprized of the
charges against him and after a fair trial in
accordance with constitutional procedural
safeguards.
150
The Ker-Frisbie doctrine stands for the general rule that
regardless of the means by which U.S. agents obtain custody of
criminal suspects from foreign states, U.S. courts will not be
divested of jurisdiction.' 51 It is important to note that in neither
146 Id. at 439.
147 Matthew W. Henning, Note: Extradition Controversies: How
Enthusiastic Prosecutions Can Lead to International Incidents, 22 B.C.
INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 347, 362 (1999).
14' Ker, 119 U.S. 436 at 444. See also id. at 440 (holding that "mere
irregularities in the manner in which he may be brought into the
custody of the law, we do not think he is entitled to say that he should
not be tried at all for the crime with which he is charged in a regular
indictment).
149 Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 520 (1952). Michigan police
forcibly seized Collins from Illinois and brought him to Michigan to
stand trial.
50 Id. at 522.
151 See Henning, supra note 147, at 363. See also Bassiouni, supra note
63, at 228 (recognizing that U.S. courts traditionally uphold in
personam jurisdiction over criminal suspects, even when secured
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case did the sovereign state lodge a complaint, aside from failure
to follow formal extradition procedures, on the breach of its
territorial sovereignty. 152 Additionally, in Ker, the forcible
abduction was carried out by a private agent rather than a
government agent, as is typically the case."'
In United States v. Toscanino, the Second Circuit
imposed an important qualification on the Ker-Frisbie
doctrine. 154 Toscanino, an Italian citizen residing in South
America, was abducted from Montevideo, Uruguay and brought
to Brazil. 155 Toscanino claimed that the police tortured him in
Brazil for seventeen days, and subjected him to extensive
interrogation before he was drugged and flown to New York
where he was tried and convicted on charges that he conspired to
import narcotics into the United States in violation of U.S.
law. 
1 56
The Toscanino court held that the Ker-Frisbie doctrine
could no longer bar an examination into the due process issues
surrounding a defendant's forcible abduction back to the United
States. That court stated that it viewed "due process as now
requiring a court to divest itself of jurisdiction over the person of
a defendant where it has been acquired as the result of the
government's deliberate, unnecessary and unreasonable invasion
of the accused's constitutional rights.' ' 57 A year later, the same
court of appeals, albeit a different panel, narrowed the Toscanino
holding. In United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, the court held
irregularities in the means by which a defendant is brought
before a criminal court is by itself insufficient to divest a court of
through illegal methods, including forcible abduction).
152 George B. Newhouse, Jr., The Long Arm of the Law: The United
States has Statutory Authority to Pursue Terrorists Wherever they may
be Found Throughout the World, L.A. LAWYER Aug. 25, 2002, at 35.
"' Id. at 35.
154 United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 275 (2d Cir. 1974).
... Henning, supra note 147, at 365.
156 Id. at 365-66.
157 Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267.
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jurisdiction. 58 The court narrowed its holding in Toscanino to
circumstances of "shocking governmental conduct." 159 It is
important to note that the U.S. Supreme Court has not endorsed
the Toscanino exception. Toscanino, to the extent that it is good
law, permits defendants who are forcibly brought to the United
States to make a due process argument that the courts should
discuss the charges against them if they find shocking
government misconduct.)6
In Alvarez-Machain, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
forcible abductions did not violate the U.S.-Mexico extradition
treaty because the treaty did not prohibit abductions.161 In 1985,
a U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA") agent named
Kiki Camarena was kidnapped, tortured, and murdered in
Guadalajara, Mexico. Dr. Humberto Alvarez-Machain, a
gynecologist, was indicted in the United States for his
involvement. 162 In December 1989, through a paid informant,
DEA agents began negotiating with officials from the Mexican
Federal Judicial Police ("MFJP") for the informal surrender of
Alvarez-Machain. 163 The DEA agreed to pay the Mexican
officials a $50,000 reward as well as the expenses for
transporting Alvarez-Machain to the United States. On April 2,
1990, Alvarez-Machain was abducted from his office in
Guadalajara, Mexico and flown to El Paso, Texas, where DEA
agents arrested him.' 64 It was later learned that the MFJP told
the DEA that the Mexican Attorney General supported the
informal surrender of Alvarez-Machain, but preferred to keep the
158 See United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 65 (2d Cir.
1975).
' See id at 66. Contra Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F. 2d 255,
263 (7th Cir. 1990) (rejecting the Toscanino court's rationale to the
extent that it creates an exclusionary rule).
160 See Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, at 275.
161 See Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, at 663.
162 Id. at 657.
163 Henning, supra note 147, at 363.
164 Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, at 657.
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arrangements secret to avoid negative public reaction. 165
Through diplomatic channels, the Mexican government officially
protested against the U.S. Department of State for the
kidnapping of Dr. Alvarez-Machain. 166 The Mexican
government protested on the grounds that the United States
disregarded its obligations under the U.S.-Mexico Extradition
Treaty, and that the U.S. kidnapping violated customary
international law.
167
The Court held that kidnapping did not violate the terms
of the U.S.-Mexico treaty because the treaty's language did not
explicitly prohibit abductions. 16' The Court then applied the
Ker-Frisbie doctrine and held that Alvarez-Machain could stand
trial in the U.S. 169 The Alvarez-Machain case was remanded for
trial, where Alvarez-Machain was acquitted and then returned to
Mexico.170 In 1993, Alvarez-Machain filed a civil suit, under the
Alien Tort Claims Act ("ATCA") against the United States, the
DEA agents, and the Mexican officials involved in his
abduction, detention, and torture.' 7' While his abduction might
not have violated U.S. law in so far as divesting the courts of in
personam jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit held that Alvarez could
nonetheless bring this civil suit for damages.
72
B. International Law
Although the U.S. courts may assert jurisdiction despite
the mode of rendition, it does not mean that forcible abductions
do not violate international law.173 In upholding the abduction of
165 Henning, supra note 147, at 363-64.
166 Brief for Respondent Humberto Alvarez-Machain at 3, United
States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992) (No. 91-712).167 id.
168 See Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, at 663.
169 i.
170 Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 266 F.3d 1045,1049 (9th Cir.
2001).
171 id.
172 See id. at 1064
173 See Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, at 668-670.
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Alvarez-Machain from Mexico, the Supreme Court even
acknowledged that transborder abductions may violate principles
of general international law.1
74
Extraterritorial abductions violate customary
international law. 175 It is a fundamental principle under
international law that a violation of a state's territory is a
violation of its sovereignty. 176 A state may not exercise its
power within the territory of another State without consent.
177
The United Nations ("U.N.") Charter does not expressly prohibit
extraterritorial abductions. It does, however, recognize a state's
territorial integrity. 178 After Israel's kidnapping of Eichmann
from Argentina, the U.N. passed a non-binding resolution
condemning the abduction. 179 The resolution states that
extraterritorial abduction, without the consent of the asylum
state, is a violation of state sovereignty and the U.N. Charter. 8
171 Id. at 669.
175 See Kristin Berdan Weissman, Extraterritorial Abduction. The
Endangerment of Future Peace, 27 U.C. DAVis L. REV. 459, 473
(1994)(discussing customary international law).
176 See The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 136 (1812)
("The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily
exclusive and absolute").
177 See The Case of the S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey), P.C.I.J. Ser. A
No. 9 at 18; 2 Hudson, World Ct. Rep. 20, 27-28 (1927). See also
RESTATEMENT, supra note 23, § 432(2).
178 See U.N. CHARTER Art. 2, para. 4., (stating that "All members shall
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or
in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.")
Available at http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter.
179 See U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., 865 th mtg, at 4, U.N. Doc.
S/INF/15/Rev. 1 (1960)
180 Id. See also Weissman, supra note 175, at 473 (discussing that the
resolution states that Article 2 of the U.N. Charter prohibits
extraterritorial abductions).
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VIII. Responses to Extraterritorial Abductions
Forcible abduction may not automatically disturb a U.S.
court's jurisdiction, but that does not mean that either the
abducted individual or the asylum state do not have remedies
available to them.181 To the extent that Toscanino is good law,
the abducted suspect could argue that the U.S. courts lack
jurisdiction because there was shocking government misconduct
involved in the abduction. 8 2 As was the case with Alvarez-
Machain, the abducted individual may bring a civil suit against
the U.S. government under the ATCA 183 for claims relating to
the kidnap, detention, and any possible mistreatment. 184 There
may also be a claim against any agents from the asylum state that
may have assisted in the abduction.
85
There are various diplomatic remedies available to an
asylum state when its rights under international law are violated.
The asylum state may protest the abduction as a violation of
international law. 186 In the case of Alvarez-Machain, the
Mexican government lodged a formal protest with the U.S.
Department of State, and filed an amicus brief with the U.S.
Supreme Court. 87 Such action can lead to an apology from the
abducting state or reparations as compensation for the violation
181 See Jeffrey J. Carlisle, Extradition of Government Agents as a
Municipal Law Remedy for State-Sponsored Kidnapping, 81 CALIF. L.
REV. 1541, 1555 (1993).
182 See Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, at 275.
183 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2003) (stating that "The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States.").
184 See Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, at 1064.185 Carlisle, supra note 181, at 1558.
186 RESTATEMENT, supra note 23, § 432(2) rept. note 1. See also
Henning, supra note 148, (where the Mexican government protests the
U.S. agents' abduction of Alvarez-Machain from Mexico).
187 See Brief for Respondent Humberto Alvarez-Machain supra note
166.
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of international law. 188 The asylum state may request the
abducted person be returned. The Restatement of Foreign
Relations Law provides that "the state from which the person
was abducted may demand return of the person, and international
law requires that he be returned.' ' 189 Another possibility is the
prosecution of the agents who abducted the suspect. This is
premised on the notion that the agents from the abducting-state
have violated both international law and the municipal law of the
asylum state, where the abduction occurred.' 90
IX. Discussion: Failed States vs. Uncooperative States
A. Overview
Rendition of international terrorists raises three
possibilities. First, it is possible that no one can find the
suspected terrorist.191 Second, the United States can find the
suspect with the assistance of the asylum state. Third, if the
asylum state is unable or unwilling to cooperate, the U.S. may
operate unilaterally to obtain custody of the suspect and return
him to the U.S. for trial.
B. Uncooperative States
When a suspect's location is ascertained, an asylum state
may cooperate by extraditing the suspect pursuant to a treaty, or
handing him over to U.S. authorities by deportation or expulsion.
A problem emerges when the asylum state does not cooperate
with methods of rendition, including, but not limited to,
extradition. In the case of Alvarez-Machain, Mexico denied U.S.
requests for extradition.' After Mexico's decision, U.S. agents
188 See Carlisle, supra note 176, at 1557-1558 (discussing diplomatic
remedies for a violation of international law).
189 RESTATEMENT, supra note 23,§ 432(2).
190 Carlisle, supra note 181, at 1558-1559 (discussing prosecution of
government agents for municipal law violations).191 Report, supra note 64, at 8.
192 See Royal J. Stark, Comment: The Ker-Frisbie-Alvarez Doctrine:
International Law, Due Process, and United States Sponsored
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abducted Alvarez-Machain, without the consent of the Mexican
government, and returned him to the United States for trial.
Another possibility is where the United States does not
have an extradition treaty with an asylum state. Without an
extradition treaty, a state has no general duty under international
law to extradite. 193 For example, the asylum state may be
providing sanctuary for criminal suspects, such as Afghanistan's
harboring of Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda operatives. In the
aftermath of the September 1 1th attacks, evidence pointed to
Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda as potential suspects. However,
Afghanistan's Taliban regime, which was sympathetic to al
Qaeda, refused to cooperate with U.S. authorities in extraditing
those suspected of involvement in the September 1 1th attacks.
In the case of an uncooperative state, the United States
first tries to induce cooperation through diplomacy, economic
sanctions, or even through disguised extradition, such as luring.
PDD-39 indicates that the United States may return suspects by
force, without the cooperation of an asylum state. 194 While
forcible abduction of criminal suspects from foreign states will
not divest U.S. courts of jurisdiction, it nonetheless violates
international law.
95
There could be serious international consequences for
the United States if it were to forcibly abduct a suspect from an
uncooperative foreign state. For instance, it could face a claim
before the International Court of Justice for violating the asylum
state's territorial integrity. 196 The United Nations could also take
Kidnapping of Foreign Nationals Abroad, 9 CONN. J. INT'L L. 113, 149
(1993) (discussing that Mexico did not violate international law by
declining to extradite Alvarez-Machain to the United States).
19 3 Id. at 149-150.
194 Presidential Decision Directive-39, supra note 126.
195 See BASSIOUNI, supra note 62, at 223 (explaining that although
forcible abduction violates international law, other informal modes of
surrender do not. With informal modes of surrender there is no
violation of the asylum state's sovereignty or territorial integrity).
196 See Michael Gunlicks, Citizenship as a Weapon in Controlling the
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up the matter and condemn the abduction, as it did following
Israel's abduction of Eichmann from Argentina in 1960. '
However, it is unlikely that the Security Council could pass such
a resolution, as the United States is a permanent member and has
veto power. Another possibility is a military response by the
asylum state to the unauthorized abduction.
C. Failed States
A problem emerges when the suspect's location in an
asylum state is known, but the government of that state is unable
to cooperate because it is incapable of discharging basic
governmental functions in regards to its populace and territory.
Here, the asylum state is known as a failed state. 98 International
law defines a state as an entity that has a defined territory and a
permanent population, under the control of its own government,
and has the capacity to engage in formal relations with other
states. 99 Key to this definition in the context of extradition is
the ability to conduct international relations with other states.2 °°
Because there is a loss of the institutional capability of the
government in a failed state, laws are not made, cases are not
decided, and international agreements and treaties are not
honored.20'
Flood of Undocumented Aliens: Evaluation of Proposed Denials of
Citizenship to Children of Undocumented Aliens Born in the United
States, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 551, 566 (1995) (discussing potential
consequences for violations of international law).
'9' See U.N. SCOR, supra note 179, at 4.
198 See Ruth Gordon, Growing Constitutions, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
528, 533 (1999). See also Henry J. Richardson, III, "Failed States, "
Self-Determination, and Preventive Diplomacy: Colonialist Nostalgia
and Democratic Expectations, 10 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 1, 2
(1996) (discussing the emergence of the concept of "failed states" in
the early 1990s).
19' See RESTATEMENT, supra note 23, § 201. See also Kadic v. Karadzic,
70 F.3d 232, 244 (2d Cir. 1995) (providing the definition of a state).
200 Gordon, supra note 198.
201 Id. at 533-34.
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In examining the roots of failed states, the World Bank
has identified three "pathologies of state collapse:"
[1] States that have lost (or failed to establish)
legitimacy in the eyes of most of the population
nationally under their authority, and are
therefore unable to exercise that authority
[2] States that have been run into the ground by
leaders and officials who are corrupt, negligent,
incompetent, or all three
[3] States that have fragmented in civil war, and
in which no party is capable of reestablishing
central authority.20 2
Somalia is a classic example of a failed state. It has been
without an effective central government since President
Mohamed Siad Barre was ousted from power in 1991.203 It is a
nation that disintegrated because of a violent and bloody civil
war between various clans.20 4 What most states would consider
rudimentary government services, such as education, medical
care, and infrastructure maintenance, barely exist in Somalia.20 5
It is a land divided, as local clans in the north declared the
Republic of Somaliland in 1991, and clans in the northeastern
region declared a self-governing Puntland in 1998.206 In the
Somali capital of Mogadishu, various factions have engaged in a
tug-of-war power struggle for control of the city. 207 Since
Somalia does not have a functioning central government, the
202 WORLD BANK, 1997 World Development Report 158 (1997).
203 Osman Hassan, Rival Somali Clans Kill at Least 6, ASSOCIATED
PREss, Feb. 13, 2002, available at 2002 WL 13775855.
204 Gordon, supra note 198, at 534
205 Id.
206 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Fact Book 2003 (2003),
available at
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/so.html).
207 id.
VOL. 12
TRUMPETING JUSTICE
United States would be unable to rely upon extradition to obtain
custody of international terrorists from Somalia.
The case of Abdi Dhere illustrates the complexities of
international rendition from a failed state. Dhere, a well-known
local hitman in Somalia, assassinated Sean Devereauz, a British
teacher providing humanitarian aid to the people of Somalia. °s
The local police force, which was newly formed in 1993, was
afraid to arrest Dhere because he was well connected to the clan
faction controlling that area of Somalia.20 9 The police feared that
Dhere's arrest would make the police a target for attack.210
There was a plan for U.S. troops to apprehend Dhere and take
him to Britain for trial, but the legal implications of abduction
caused the United States to abandon that idea.21 There was no
extradition treaty between the U.K. and Somalia, but even if a
treaty existed, it would not have been useful since Somalia had
no functioning government to ratify or enforce it.212 U.S. troops
and international peacekeepers withdrew from Somalia without
having arrested or prosecuted Dhere for the murder of the British
teacher.
Because failed states do not have functional
governments, the only ways the United States may obtain
custody of a suspect is by either luring the suspect out of the
state's territory or by abduction. This approach differs from
obtaining custody of a suspect from an uncooperative state,
where the requesting state can use diplomatic tools to persuade
the asylum state to cooperate. Since failed states do not have
functional governments, diplomatic tools cannot be used.
A fundamental principle of international law is the
nonintervention in the internal affairs of another state. 213
208 See Keith B. Richburg, Getting Away with Murder in Somalia,
WASH. POST, Apr. 8, 1993, at A3 1, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-adv/archives/front.htm.
209 id
2 10 id.
211 id
212 d.213 Ruth Gordon, United Nations Intervention in Internal Conflicts:
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However, in the past decade there has been an increasing
recognition of the permissibility of international intervention in
certain limited circumstances, such as when a state faces a
massive influx of refugees.214 Whether this relaxation of attitudes
towards the nonintervention principle could ever extend so far as
to cover unilateral abduction of a suspected criminal in a failed
state is unclear, but given the somewhat reluctant international
response to the humanitarian crisis in Iraq following the first
Gulf War, such a position seems unlikely.215
X. Conclusions
When criminal suspects are brought before U.S. courts,
by forcible abduction or any other means of rendition, the courts
will not be divested of jurisdiction. 21 6 While this provides flexi-
bility to U.S. law enforcement agents in bringing criminal
suspects to justice, forcible abduction violates customary inter-
national law. 217 The September 1 1th attacks demonstrated that
international terrorists are capable of planning and carrying out
terrorist acts against the United States from abroad, particularly
from failed or uncooperative states. 21 8 This discussion has shown
that there may be times when the United States wants to obtain
custody of suspects who are located within these types of states.
In some cases, the only way to do so is through unilateral action
to abduct the suspect. Therefore, forcible abduction may be a
useful device in the war against terrorism.
PDD-39 states that the United States should exhaust all
possibilities of cooperation before it forcibly returns a suspect to
this country for trial.219 However, since failed states do not have
functioning central governments, the only way to obtain custody
Iraq, Somalia, and Beyond, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 519, 520 (1994).
214 Id. at 548-549
215 Id.
216 See Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, at 661.
217 Id. at 669.
218 Sipress, supra note 4.
219 PDD-39 supra note 126.
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of a suspect is through abduction. On the other hand, there are
political, diplomatic, and legal consequences that the United
States needs to consider before it engages in unilateral action to
return a suspect from an uncooperative state. Forcibly returning
a suspect without the host state's consent could seriously harm
U.S. prestige and credibility, as well as exhaust necessary
political capital required to persuade other states to cooperate on
rendition matters.
